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Abstract—Binary code similarity approaches compare two or
more pieces of binary code to identify their similarities and
differences. The ability to compare binary code enables many
real-world applications on scenarios where source code may not
be available such as patch analysis, bug search, and malware
detection and analysis. Over the past 20 years numerous binary
code similarity approaches have been proposed, but the research
area has not yet been systematically analyzed. This paper presents
a first survey of binary code similarity. It analyzes 61 binary code
similarity approaches, which are systematized on four aspects: (1)
the applications they enable, (2) their approach characteristics,
(3) how the approaches are implemented, and (4) the benchmarks
and methodologies used to evaluate them. In addition, the survey
discusses the scope and origins of the area, its evolution over the
past two decades, and the challenges that lie ahead.
Keywords—Code diffing, Code search, Cross-architecture, Pro-
gram executables
I. INTRODUCTION
Binary code similarity approaches compare two or more
pieces of binary code e.g., basic blocks, functions, or whole
programs, to identify their similarities and differences. Com-
paring binary code is fundamental in scenarios where the
program source code is not available, which happens with
commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) programs, legacy programs,
and malware. Binary code similarity has a wide list of real-
world applications such as bug search [1], [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], malware
clustering [16], [17], [18], malware detection [19], [20], [21],
malware lineage [22], [23], [24], patch generation [25], patch
analysis [26], [27], [28], [29], [8], [30], [31], porting infor-
mation across program versions [32], [26], [27], and software
theft detection [33].
Identifying binary code similarity is challenging because
much program semantics are lost due to the compilation
process including function names, variable names, source
comments, and data structure definitions. Additionally, even
when the program source code does not change, the binary
code may change if the source is recompiled, due to secondary
changes introduced by the compilation process. For exam-
ple, the resulting binary code can significantly change when
using different compilers, changing compiler optimizations,
and selecting different target operating systems and CPU
architectures. Furthermore, obfuscation transformations can be
applied on both the source code and the generated binary code,
hiding the original code.
Given its applications and challenges, over the past 20
years numerous binary code similarity approaches have been
proposed. However, as far as we know there does not exist a
systematic survey of this research area. Previous surveys deal
with binary code obfuscation techniques in packer tools [34],
binary code type inference [35], and dynamic malware analysis
techniques [36]. Those topics are related because binary code
similarity may need to tackle obfuscation, binary code type
inference may leverage similar binary analysis platforms, and
malware is often a target of binary code similarity approaches.
But, binary code similarity is well-separated from those topics
as shown by previous surveys having no overlap with this paper
on the set of papers analyzed. Other surveys have explored
similarity detection on any binary data, i.e., not specific to
code, such as hashing for similarity search [37] and similarity
metrics on numerical and binary feature vectors [38], [39].
In contrast, this survey focuses on approaches that compare
binary code, i.e., that disassemble the executable byte stream.
This paper presents a first survey of binary code simi-
larity. It first identifies 61 binary code similarity approaches
through a systematic selection process that examines over a
hundred papers published in research venues from different
computer science areas such as computer security, software
engineering, programming languages, and machine learning.
Then, it systematizes four aspects of those 61 approaches: (1)
the applications they enable, (2) their approach characteristics,
(3) how the approaches have been implemented, and (4) the
benchmarks and methodologies used to evaluate them. In
addition, it discusses the scope and origin of binary code
similarity, its evolution over the past two decades, and the
challenges that lie ahead.
Binary code similarity approaches widely vary in their
approach, implementation, and evaluation. This survey sys-
tematizes each of those aspects, and summarizes the results
in easy to access tables that compare the 61 approaches across
multiple dimensions, allowing beginners and experts to quickly
understand their similarities and differences. For example, the
approach systematization includes, among others, the number
of input pieces of binary code being compared (e.g., one-
to-one, one-to-many, many-to-many); the granularity of the
pieces of binary code analyzed (e.g., basic blocks, functions,
programs); whether the comparison happens at the syntactical
representation, the graph structure, or the code semantics; the
type of analysis used (e.g., static, dynamic, symbolic), and
the techniques used for scalability (e.g., hashing, embedding,
indexing). The implementation systematization includes the
binary analysis platforms used to build the approach, the
programming languages used to code it, the supported archi-
tectures for the input pieces of binary code being compared,
and whether the approach is publicly released. The evaluation
systematization covers the datasets on which the approaches
are evaluated and the evaluation methodology including the
type of evaluation (e.g., accuracy, comparison wih prior works,
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
11
42
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
5 S
ep
 20
19
performance) and how the robustness of the approach is evalu-
ated in face of common code transformations such as compiler
and compilation option changes, different architectures, and
obfuscation.
Beyond the systematization, this survey also discusses how
binary code similarity has evolved from binary code diffing
to binary code search and how the focus has moved from a
single architecture to cross-architecture approaches. It shows
that the present of the field is vibrant as many new approaches
are still being proposed. It discusses technical challenges that
remain open, but concludes that the future of the area is
bright with important applications scenarios under way such
as those related to binary code search engines and the Internet-
of-Things.
Paper structure. This paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides an overview of binary code similarity. Section III
details the scope of the survey and the paper selection process.
Section IV summarizes applications of binary code similar-
ity and Section §V the evolution of the field over the last
two decades. Section VI systematizes the characteristics of
the 61 binary code similarity approaches, Section VII their
implementation, and Section VIII their evaluation. Finally, we
discuss future research directions in Section IX, and conclude
in Section X.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we first provide background on the com-
pilation process (§II-A). Then, we present an overview of the
binary code similarity problem (§II-B).
A. Compilation Process
Binary code refers to the machine code that is produced
by the compilation process and that can be run directly by
a CPU. The standard compilation process takes as input the
source code files of a program. It compiles them with a chosen
compiler and optimization level and for a specific platform
(defined by the architecture, word size, and OS) producing
object files. Those object files are then linked into a binary
program, either a stand-alone executable or a library.
Binary code similarity approaches typically deal with an
extended compilation process, illustrated in Figure 1, which
adds two optional steps to the standard compilation process:
source code and binary code transformations. Both types of
transformations are typically semantics-preserving (i.e., do not
change the program functionality) and are most commonly
used for obfuscation, i.e., to hamper reverse-engineering of
the distributed binary programs. Source code transformations
happen pre-compilation. Thus, their input and output are both
source code. They can be applied regardless of the target
platform, but may be specific to the programming language
used to write the program. On the other hand, binary code
transformations happen post-compilation. Thus, their input
and output are binary code. They are independent of the
programming language used, but may be specific to the target
platform.
Obfuscation is a fundamental step in malware, but can also
be applied to benign programs, e.g., to protect their intellectual
property. There exist off-the-shelf obfuscation tools that use
source code transformations (e.g., Tigress [40]), as well as
binary code transformations (e.g., packers [41]). Packing is
a binary code transformation widely used by malware. Once
a new version of a malware family is ready, the malware
authors pack the resulting executable to hide its functionality
and thus bypass detection by commercial malware detectors.
The packing process takes as input an executable and produces
another executable with the same functionality, but with the
original code hidden (e.g., encrypted as data and unpacked at
runtime). The packing process is typically applied many times
to the same input executable, creating polymorphic variants of
exactly the same source code, which look different to malware
detectors. Nowadays, the majority of malware is packed and
malware often uses custom packers for which off-the-shelf
unpackers are not available [41].
A main challenge in binary code similarity is that the
compilation process can produce different binary code repre-
sentations for the same source code. An author can modify
any of the grey boxes in Figure 1 to produce a different,
but semantically-equivalent, binary program from the same
source code. Some of these modifications may be due to
the standard compilation process. For example, to improve
program efficiency an author may vary the compiler’s opti-
mization level, or change the compiler altogether. Both changes
will transform the produced binary code, despite the source
code remaining unchanged. An author may also change the
target platform to obtain a version of the program suitable
for a different architecture. In this case, the produced binary
code may radically differ if the new target architecture uses a
different instruction set. An author may also deliberately apply
obfuscation transformations to produce polymorphic variants
of the same source code. The produced variants will typically
have the same functionality defined by the original source
code. A desirable goal for binary code similarity approaches
is that they are able to identify the similarity of binary code
that corresponds to the same source code having undergone
different transformations. The robustness of a binary code
similarity approach captures the compilation and obfuscation
transformations that it can handle, i.e., the transformations
despite which it can still detect similarity.
B. Binary Code Similarity Overview
Binary code similarity approaches compare pieces of bi-
nary code. The three main characteristics of binary code
similarity approaches are: (1) the type of the comparison
(identical, similar, equivalent), (2) the granularity of the pieces
of binary code being compared (e.g., instructions, basic blocks,
functions), and (3) the number of input pieces being compared
(one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-many). We detail these
three characteristics next. For simplicity, we describe the
comparison type and comparison granularity for two inputs
and then generalize to multiple inputs.
Comparison type. Two (or more) pieces of binary code
are identical if they have the same syntax, i.e., the same
representation. The binary code can be represented in different
ways such as an hexadecimal string of raw bytes, a sequence of
disassembled instructions, or a control-flow graph. Determin-
ing if several pieces of binary code are identical is a Boolean
decision (either they are identical or not) that it is easy to
check: simply apply a cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA256) to
the contents of each piece. If the hash is the same, the pieces
are identical. However, such straightforward approach fails to
detect similarity in many cases. For example, compiling the
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Fig. 1. The extended compilation process. Dotted boxes are optional code transformations typically used for obfuscation. For a given source code, changing
any of the grey boxes may produce a different binary program.
same program source code twice, using the same compilation
parameters (i.e., same compiler version, same optimization
level, same target platform) produces two executables with
different file hash. This happens because the executable may
include metadata that differs in both compilations such as
the compilation date, which is automatically computed and
included into the header of the generated executable.
Two pieces of binary code are equivalent if they have the
same semantics, i.e., if they offer exactly the same functional-
ity. Equivalence does not care about the syntax of the binary
code. Clearly, two identical pieces of binary code will have
the same semantics, but different pieces of binary code may
as well. For example, mov %eax,$0 and xor %eax,%eax
are semantically equivalent x86 instructions because both set
the value of register EAX to zero. Similarly, the same source
code compiled for two different target architectures should pro-
duce equivalent executables, whose syntax may be completely
different if the architectures use different instruction sets.
Proving that two arbitrary programs are functionally equivalent
is an undecidable problem that reduces to solving the halting
problem [42]. In practice, determining binary code equivalence
is a very expensive process that can only be performed for
small pieces of binary code.
Two pieces of binary code can be considered similar if
their syntax, structure, or semantics are similar. Syntactic
similarity compares the code representation. For example,
clone detection approaches consider that a target piece of
binary code is a clone of some source binary code if their
syntax are similar. Structural similarity compares graph rep-
resentations of binary code (e.g., control flow graphs, call-
graphs). It sits between syntactic and semantic similarity.
The intuition is that the control flow of the binary code
captures to some extent its semantics, e.g., the decisions taken
on the data. Furthermore, the graph representation captures
multiple syntactic representations of the same functionality.
However, it is possible to modify the graph structure without
affecting the semantics, e.g., by inlining functions. Semantic
similarity compares the code functionality. A simple approach
to semantic similarity compares the interaction between the
program and its environment through OS APIs or system
calls. But, two programs with similar system calls can perform
significantly different processing on their output, so more fine-
grained semantic similarity approaches focus on a syntax-
independent comparison of the code.
Generally speaking, the more robust an approach is, i.e., the
more transformations it can capture, the more expensive it also
is. Syntactic similarity approaches are cheapest to compute,
but least robust. They are sensitive to simple changes in the
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Fig. 2. Similarity at a finer granularity can be used to infer a different type
of similarity at a coarser granularity.
binary code, e.g., register reallocation, instruction reordering,
replacing instructions with semantically equivalent ones. Struc-
tural similarity sits in the middle. It is robust against multiple
syntactical transformations, but sensitive to transformations
that change code structure such as code inlining or removal
of unused function parameters. Semantic similarity is robust
against semantics-preserving transformations, despite changes
to the code syntax and structure, but it is very expensive to
compute for large pieces of binary code.
Comparison granularity. Binary code similarity approaches
can be applied at different granularities. Common granularities
are instructions; basic blocks; functions; and whole programs.
To perform a comparison at a coarser granularity, some ap-
proaches use a different comparison at a finer granularity, and
then combine the finer granularity results. For example, to
compare whether two programs are similar, an approach could
determine the fraction of identical functions between both pro-
grams. Thus, we differentiate between the input granularity,
i.e., the granularity of the input pieces of binary code that the
approach compares, and the approach granularities, i.e., the
granularities of the different comparisons in the approach.
Applying a specific comparison at a finer granularity may
restrict the type of comparison that can be performed at a
coarser granularity, as illustrated in Figure 2. The figure shows
that computing whether two pieces of binary code are identical
at a finer granularity (e.g., basic block) can be used to compute
that the coarser granularity pieces that encompass them (e.g.,
their functions) are identical, equivalent, or similar. However,
similarity at a finer granularity cannot be used to infer that
the coarser granularity code is equivalent or identical. For
example, when comparing two functions, just because all
their basic blocks are similar, it cannot be concluded that
the functions are identical or equivalent. On the other hand,
similarity is the most general type of comparison and any finer
granularity comparison type can be used to infer it.
Number of inputs. Binary code similarity approaches can
compare two or more pieces of binary code. Those that com-
pare more than two pieces can further be split into comparing
one piece to the rest or comparing each piece to all other
pieces. Thus, we identify three types of approaches based on
the number of inputs and how they are compared: one-to-one
(OO), one-to-many (OM ), and many-to-many (MM ). The
source of the input pieces is application-dependent. They may
come from the same program version (e.g., two functions of
the same executable), from two versions of the same program,
and from two different programs.
One-to-one approaches compare an original piece of binary
code (also called source, old, plaintiff, or reference) to a target
piece of binary code (also called new, patched, or upgrade).
Most OO approaches perform binary code diffing, i.e., they
diff two consecutive, or close, versions of the same program
to identify what was added, removed, or modified in the target
(patched) version. The granularity of binary code diffing is
most often functions and the diffing tries to obtain a mapping
between a function in the original program version and another
function in the target program version. Added functions are
original functions that cannot be mapped to a target function;
removed functions are target functions that cannot be mapped
to an original function; and modified functions are mapped
functions that are not identical.
One-to-many approaches compare a query piece of binary
code to many target pieces of binary code. Most OM ap-
proaches perform binary code search, i.e., they search if the
query piece is similar to any of the target pieces and return
the top k most similar target pieces of binary code. The target
pieces may come from multiple versions of the same program
(different than the version the query piece comes from), from
different programs compiled for the same architecture, or from
programs compiled for different architectures.
In contrast to OO and OM approaches, many-to-many ap-
proaches do not distinguish between source and target pieces.
All input pieces are considered equal and compared against
each other. These approaches typically perform binary code
clustering, i.e., they output groups of similar pieces of binary
code called clusters.
III. SCOPE & PAPER SELECTION
To keep our survey of the state-of-the-art focused and
manageable it is important to define what is, and what is not,
within scope. Overall, the main restriction is that we focus
on works that compare binary code. This restriction, in turn,
introduces the following four constraints:
1) We exclude approaches that require access to the source
code, namely source-to-source (e.g., [43]) and source-to-
binary (e.g., [44]) similarity approaches.
2) We exclude approaches that operate on bytecode
(e.g., [45], [46]).
3) We exclude behavioral approaches that compare similarity
exclusively on the interaction of a program with its envi-
ronment through system calls or OS API calls (e.g., [47],
[48], [49], [50]).
4) We exclude approaches that consider binary code as a
sequence of raw bytes with no structure such as file hashes
(e.g., [51]), fuzzy hashes (e.g., [52], [53]), and signature-
based approaches (e.g., [54], [55]). Approaches need to
disassemble raw bytes into instructions to be considered.
While we do not include the papers describing byte-
level approaches, we do examine the use of some of
those techniques (e.g., fuzzy hashing) by the analyzed
approaches.
In addition, we introduce the following constraints to keep
the scope of the survey manageable:
5) We limit the survey to papers published on peer-reviewed
venues and technical reports from academic institutions.
Thus, we do not analyze tools, but rather the research
works describing their approach (e.g., [26], [27] for
BINDIFF).
6) We exclude papers that do not propose a new binary code
similarity approach or technique, but simply apply off-
the-shelf binary code similarity tools as a step towards
their goal.
Paper selection. To identify candidate papers, we first system-
atically examined all papers published in the last 20 years in
14 top venues for computer security and software engineering:
IEEE S&P, ACM CCS, USENIX Security, NDSS, ACSAC,
RAID, ESORICS, ASIACCS, DIMVA, ICSE, FSE, ISSTA, ASE,
and MSR. Not all relevant binary code similarity approaches
have been published in those venues, which is especially true
for early approaches. To identify candidate papers in other
venues, we extensively queried specialized search engines
such as Google Scholar using terms related to binary code
similarity and its applications, e.g., code search, binary diffing,
bug search. We also carefully examined the references of
the candidate papers for any further papers we may have
missed. This exploration identified over a hundred candidate
papers. We then read each candidate paper to determine if they
proposed a binary code similarity approach that satisfied the
above scope constraints.
In the end, we identified the 61 binary code similarity
research works in Table I, whose approaches are systematized.
The first three columns of Table I capture the name of
the approach, the year of publication, and the venue where
the work was published. The research works are sorted by
publication date creating a timeline of the development of the
field. Papers are identified by their system name, if available,
otherwise by the initials of each author’s last name and the
year of publication. The 61 papers have been published in 37
venues. Binary code similarity is quite multidisciplinary; while
most papers appear in computer security venues (36 papers in
20 venues), there are works in software engineering (13 papers
in 8 venues), systems (6 papers in 4 venues), and machine
learning (2 papers in 2 venues). The venues with most binary
code similarity papers are: DIMVA (6), ASE (4), CCS (3),
USENIX Security (3), and PLDI (3).
IV. APPLICATIONS
This section motivates the importance of binary code
similarity by describing the applications it enables. Of the 61
papers analyzed, 36 demonstrate an application, i.e., present
a quantitative evaluation, or case studies, of at least one
application. The other 23 papers present generic binary code
similarity capabilities that can be used for multiple applications
such as binary diffing tools (e.g., [84], [85], [86]), binary
code search platforms (e.g., [72], [62], [71]), and binary clone
detection approaches (e.g., [74], [73], [56], [65]). Table II
summarizes the eight applications identified. Most of the 36
TABLE I. COMPARISON AMONG BINARY CODE SIMILARITY APPROACHES. FOR BOOLEAN COLUMNS X MEANS SUPPORTED AND 7 UNSUPPORTED.
INPUT COMPARISON CAN BE ONE-TO-ONE (OO), ONE-TO-MANY (OM), OR MANY-TO-MANY (MM). INPUT GRANULARITY AND APPROACH
GRANULARITIES CAN BE INSTRUCTION (I), BASIC BLOCK (B), FUNCTION (F), OR PROGRAM (P). APPROACH COMPARISON CAN BE SIMILAR (S),
IDENTICAL (I), OR EQUIVALENT (E). STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY CAN USE CFG (C), ICFG (I), CALLGRAPH (G), AND OTHER CUSTOM GRAPHS (O).
MACHINE LEARNING CAN BE SUPERVISED (S) OR UNSUPERVISED (U). IN NORMALIZATION, 7 MEANS NO NORMALIZATION,  OPERAND REMOVAL,
• OPERAND NORMALIZATION, ◦ MNEMONIC NORMALIZATION, AND ? CODE ELIMINATION.
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EXEDIFF [25] 1999 WCSSS OO I P I X 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
BMAT [32] 1999 FDO2 OO S,I P F,B X 7 C 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 •◦
F2004 [26] 2004 DIMVA OO S P F 7 7 C,G X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
DR2005 [27] 2005 SSTIC OO S,I P F,B,I X 7 C,G X 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
KKMRV2005 [19] 2005 RAID MM S P B* 7 X I 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
BMM2006 [20] 2006 DIMVA OO S P B* 7 X I 7 7 7 7 X 7 X •
BINHUNT [28] 2008 ICISC OO S,E P F,B 7 X C,G 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
SWPQS2006 [56] 2009 ISSTA MM S,I I* I* X 7 7 X 7 X 7 X 7 7 •
SMIT [16] 2009 CCS OM S,I P F X 7 G X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
IDEA [57] 2010 ESSoS MM S P I* X 7 7 X 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
MBC [58] 2012 RACS MM S P B X 7 7 X 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
IBINHUNT [59] 2012 ICISC OO S,E P B 7 X I 7 7 7 7 X X X 7
BEAGLE [22] 2012 ACSAC MM S P B* 7 X C 7 7 7 7 X X 7 •
BINHASH [60] 2012 ICMLA MM E F B 7 X 7 X U X 7 X 7 X •
BINJUICE [42] 2013 PPREW OO S,E P F,B 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
BINSLAYER [61] 2013 PPREW OO S P F,B 7 7 C,G 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
RENDEZVOUS [62] 2013 MSR OM S F F X 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
MUTANTX-S [17] 2013 Usenix ATC MM S P I* X 7 7 X U 7 7 X 7 7 •
EXPOSE´ [63] 2013 COMPSAC OM S,E P F,I* X X 7 X 7 7 7 X 7 X •
ILINE [23] 2013 USENIX Sec MM S P B,I* X 7 7 X U 7 7 X X 7 •◦?
LKI2013 [64] 2013 RACS OO S P F,I* 7 7 C,G X 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
TRACY [1] 2014 PLDI OM S,E F I* X X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 X ?
BINCLONE [65] 2014 SERE MM S,I I* I* X 7 7 X 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
RMKNHLLP2014 [66] 2014 DIMVA MM S F* F 7 7 7 X U 7 7 X 7 X 7
CXZ2014 [21] 2014 TDSC OM S P F 7 7 C X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
BLEX [67] 2014 USENIX Sec OO S F F 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 X X 7 7
COP [33], [68] 2014 ESEC/FSE OO S,E P F,B 7 X C 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
TEDEM [2] 2014 ACSAC OM S B* B 7 X C 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
SIGMA [69] 2015 DFRWS OO S F F 7 7 O 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
MXW2015 [24] 2015 IFIP SEC OO E P B 7 X I 7 7 7 7 X X X •?
MULTI-MH [3] 2015 S&P OM S B* B 7 X C 7 7 X X X 7 X 7
QSM2015 [70] 2015 SANER OO I F I* 7 7 O 7 7 7 7 X 7 X •?
DISCOVRE [4] 2016 NDSS OM S F B 7 7 C X 7 7 X X 7 7 7
MOCKINGBIRD [29] 2016 SANER OM S F F 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7 7
ESH [5] 2016 PLDI OM E F I* 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
TPM [71] 2016 TrustCom OO S P F 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
BINDNN [72] 2016 SecureComm OM S F F 7 7 7 7 S 7 X X 7 7 •
GENIUS [6] 2016 CCS OM S F B 7 7 C X U X X X 7 7 7
BINGO [7] 2016 FSE OM S F B*,I* 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 X ?
KLKI2016 [18] 2016 JSCOMPUT OO S P F 7 7 G X 7 7 7 X X 7 7
KAM1N0 [73] 2016 SIGKDD OM S B* B X 7 C X 7 X 7 X 7 7 •
BINSEQUENCE [8] 2017 ASIACCS OM S F B,I X 7 C 7 7 X 7 X 7 7 •
XMATCH [9] 2017 ASIACCS OM S F I* 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 X 7
CACOMPARE [74] 2017 ICPC OM S F F 7 X 7 7 7 X X X 7 7 7
SPAIN [30] 2017 ICSE OO S,I P F,B X X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 X •
BINSIGN [75] 2017 IFIP SEC OM S F F 7 7 7 X 7 X 7 X 7 7 •
GITZ [10] 2017 PLDI OM E F I* 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7
BINSHAPE [76] 2017 DIMVA OM S F F 7 7 7 X 7 X 7 X 7 7 •
BINSIM [77] 2017 USENIX Sec OO S T I* 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 X X 7
KS2017 [31] 2017 ASE OM S T I* 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7
IMF-SIM [78] 2017 ASE OO S F F 7 X 7 X S 7 7 7 X X 7
GEMINI [12] 2017 CCS OM S F F 7 7 C X S X X X 7 7 7
FOSSIL [79] 2018 TOPS OM S F F,B* 7 X C X 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
FIRMUP [13] 2018 ASPLOS OM E F I* 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 •
BINARM [14] 2018 DIMVA OM S F F 7 7 C X 7 7 7 X 7 7 •
αDIFF [15] 2018 ASE OO S P F 7 7 7 7 S 7 X X 7 7 7
VULSEEKER [11] 2018 ASE OM S F F 7 7 C X S 7 X X 7 X 7
RLZ2019 [80] 2019 BAR OM S B B 7 7 7 7 S 7 X X 7 7 •
INNEREYE [81] 2019 NDSS OM S B* B 7 7 7 7 S X X X 7 7 •
ASM2VEC [82] 2019 S&P OM S F I* 7 7 7 7 S 7 7 X 7 7 7
SAFE [83] 2019 DIMVA OM S F F 7 7 7 7 S 7 X X 7 7 7
TABLE II. APPLICATIONS EVALUATED IN THE ANALYZED BINARY CODE SIMILARITY RESEARCH WORKS.
Application Research works
Bug Search TRACY [1], TEDEM [2], MULTI-MH [3], DISCOVRE [4], ESH [5], GENIUS [6], BINGO [7], BINSEQUENCE [8]
XMATCH [9], GITZ [10], GEMINI [12], FIRMUP [13], BINARM [14], αDIFF [15], VULSEEKER [11]
Malware Clustering SMIT [16], MUTANTX-S [17], KLKI2016 [18]
Malware Detection KKMRV2005 [19], BMM2006 [20], CXZ2014 [21]
Malware Lineage BEAGLE [22], ILINE [23], MXW2015 [24]
Patch Analysis F2004 [26], DR2005 [27], BINHUNT [28], MOCKINGBIRD [29], BINSEQUENCE [8], SPAIN [30], KS2017 [31]
Patch Generation EXEDIFF [25]
Porting Information BMAT [32], F2004 [26], DR2005 [27]
Software Theft Detection COP [33]
papers demonstrate a single application, although a few (e.g.,
F2004, BINSEQUENCE) demonstrate multiple. One property
of an application is whether the application compares dif-
ferent versions of the same program (patch analysis, patch
generation, porting information, malware lineage), different
programs (malware clustering, malware detection, software
theft detection), or can be applied to both cases (bug search).
Next, we detail those applications.
1) Bug search – Arguably the most popular application of
binary code similarity is finding a known bug in a large
repository of target pieces of binary code [2], [3], [4],
[6], [11], [12], [9], [8], [7], [15], [5], [10], [13], [14], [1].
Due to code reuse, the same code may appear in multiple
programs, or even in multiple parts of the same program.
Thus, when a bug is found, it is important to identify
similar code that may have reused the buggy code and
contain the same, or a similar, bug. Bug search approaches
take as input a query buggy piece of binary code and
search for similar pieces of binary code in a repository.
A variant of this problem is cross-platform bug search,
where the target pieces of binary code in the repository
may be compiled for different platforms (e.g., x86, ARM,
MIPS) [3], [4], [6], [12], [9], [7], [15], [10], [13].
2) Malware detection – Binary code similarity can be used
to detect malware by comparing a given executable to
a set of previously known malware samples. If simi-
larity is high then the input sample is likely a variant
of a previously known malware family. Many malware
detection approaches are purely behavioral, comparing
system or API call behaviors (e.g., [47], [48]). However,
as described in Section III, we focus on approaches that
use binary code similarity [19], [20], [21].
3) Malware clustering – An evolution of malware detection
is clustering similar, known malicious, executables into
families. Each family cluster should contain executables
from the same malicious program, which can be different
versions of the malicious program, as well as polymorphic
(e.g., packed) variants of a version. Similar to malware
detection, we focus on approaches that compare binary
code [16] and exclude purely behavioral approaches based
on system calls and network traffic (e.g., [50], [87], [88]).
4) Malware lineage – Given a set of executables known to
belong to the same program, lineage approaches build
a graph where nodes are program versions and edges
capture the evolution of the program across versions.
Lineage approaches are most useful with malware because
version information is typically not available [22], [23],
[24], [89]. Since input samples should belong to the same
family, malware lineage often builds on the results of
malware clustering.
5) Patch generation and analysis – The earliest binary
code similarity application, and one of the most popular,
is to diff two consecutive, or close, versions of the
same program to identify what was patched in the newer
version. This is most useful with proprietary programs
where the vendor does not disclose patch details. The
diffing produces small binary code patches that can be
efficiently shipped to update the program [25]. It can also
be used to automatically identify security patches that fix
vulnerabilities [30], analyze those security patches [26],
[27], [28], [29], [31], [8], and generate an exploit for the
old vulnerable version [90].
6) Porting information – Binary code similarity can be used
for porting information between two close versions of
the same program. Since close versions typically share
a large amount of code, the analysis done for one version
may be largely reusable for a newer version. For example,
early binary code similarity approaches ported profiling
data [32], [91] and analysis results obtained during mal-
ware reverse engineering [26], [27].
7) Software theft detection – Binary code similarity can
be used for identifying unauthorized reuse of code from
a plantiff’s program such as the source code being
stolen, its binary code reused, a patented algorithm be-
ing reimplemented without license, or the license being
violated (e.g., GPL code in a commercial application).
Early approaches for detecting such infringements used
software birthmarks, i.e., signatures that capture inherent
functionality of the plaintiff program [92], [93]. However,
as described in Section III, we exclude signature-based
approaches and focus on approaches using binary code
similarity [33].
V. BINARY CODE SIMILARITY EVOLUTION
This section describes the origins of binary code similarity
and its evolution over the last 20 years, highlighting some
noteworthy approaches.
The origins. The origins of binary code similarity are in the
problem of generating a patch (or delta) that captures the
differences between two consecutive (or close) versions of
the same program. Text diffing tools had existed since the
1970’s (the popular UNIX diff was released in 1974) and
had been integrated in early source code versioning systems
such as SCCS [94] (1975) and RCS [95] (1985). The in-
creasing popularity of low bandwidth communication networks
(e.g., wireless) and the limited resources in some devices,
raised interest in techniques that would increase efficiency
by transmitting a small patch that captured the differences
between two versions of a binary, i.e., non-text, file, instead of
transmitting the whole file. In 1991, Reichenberger proposed
a diffing technique for generating patches between arbitrary
binary files without any knowledge about the file structure [96].
The approach worked at the byte-level, instead of the line-level
granularity of text diffing, and efficiently identified the byte
sequences that should appear in the patch because they only
appeared in the updated version and thus were not available in
the original file to be patched. Several tools for generating and
applying binary patches soon appeared such as RTPATCH [97],
BDIFF95 [98], and XDELTA [99]. Those tools worked at byte-
level and could diff any type of file.
The first binary code similarity approaches are from 1999.
That year, Baker et al. proposed an approach for compressing
differences of executable code and built a prototype diffing tool
called EXEDIFF [25], which generated patches for DEC Alpha
executables. Their intuition was that many of the changes when
diffing two executable versions of the same program represent
secondary changes due to the compilation process, as opposed
to direct changes in the source code. One example they men-
tioned is register allocation that may change at recompilation.
Another example they mentioned is that code added in the
newer version would displace parts of the old code, and thus
the compilation process would have to adjust pointer values in
the displaced code to point to the correct addresses. Their idea
was to reconstruct secondary changes at patch time, so that
they would not need to be included in the patch, reducing the
patch size. EXEDIFF is the earliest approach we have identified
that focused on computing similarity between binary code,
taking advantage of the code structure by disassembling the
raw bytes into instructions.
Also in 1999, Wang et al. presented BMAT [32], a tool that
aligned two versions of a Windows DLL library executable
to propagate profile information from the older (extensively
profiled) version to a newer version, thus reducing the need
for re-profiling. Their approach is the first to compare func-
tions and basic blocks (EXEDIFF compared two sequences of
instructions). It first matched functions in the two executables
and then matched similar blocks within each matched function.
It used a hashing technique to compare blocks. The hashing
removed relocation information to handle pointer changes, but
was order-sensitive.
The first decade. After the initial works of EXEDIFF and
BMAT, we only identify 7 binary code similarity approaches
in the next decade (2000-2009). However, some of these are
highly influential as they extend binary code similarity from
purely syntactical to also include semantics; they widen the
scope from binary code diffing (OO) to also include binary
code clustering (MM) and binary code search (OM); and they
apply binary code similarity to malware.
In 2004, Thomas Dullien (alias Halvar Flake) proposed a
graph-based binary code diffing approach that focused on the
structural properties of the code by heuristically constructing
a callgraph isomorphism that aligns functions in two versions
of the same binary program [26]. This is the first approach to
handle instruction reordering inside a function introduced by
some compiler optimizations. A followup work [27] extended
the approach to also match basic blocks inside matched func-
tions (as done in BMAT) and introduced the Small Primes
Product (SPP) hash to identify similar basic blocks despite
instruction reordering. These two works are the basis for
the popular BINDIFF binary code diffing plugin for the IDA
disassembler [84].
In 2005, Kruegel et al. proposed a graph coloring tech-
nique to detect polymorphic variants of a malware. This
is the first approach that performed semantic similarity and
MM comparison. They categorized instructions with similar
functionality into 14 semantic classes. Then, they colored the
inter-procedural control-flow graph (ICFG) using those classes.
The graph coloring is robust against syntactical obfuscations
such as junk insertion, instruction reordering, and instruction
replacement. In 2008, Gao et al. proposed BINHUNT [28]
to identify semantic differences between two versions of the
same program. This is the first approach that checks code
equivalence. It uses symbolic execution and a constraint solver
to check if two basic blocks provide the same functionality.
In 2009, Xin et al. presented SMIT [16], an approach that
given a malware sample finds similar malware in a repository.
SMIT is the first OM and binary code search approach. It
indexes malware callgraphs in a database and uses graph edit
distance to find malware with similar callgraphs.
The last decade. The last decade (2010-2019) has seen a
huge increase in the popularity of binary code similarity, with
52 approaches identified. The focus on this decade has been
on binary code search approaches, with an emphasis since
2015 on its cross-architecture version (16 approaches), and in
recent years on machine learning approaches. In 2013, Wei et
al. proposed RENDEZVOUS, a binary code search engine that
given the binary code of a query function, finds other functions
in a repository with similar syntax and structural properties.
Reducing the search granularity from whole programs (SMIT)
to smaller pieces of binary code such as functions enables an
array of applications such as clone detection and bug search.
Most binary code search approaches target the bug search
application. This application was first addressed on source code
in 2012 by Jang et al. [100]. In 2014, David et al. proposed
TRACY [1], the first binary code search approach focused on
bug search. TRACY used the concept of tracelets, an execution
path in a CFG, to find functions similar to a vulnerable
function. In 2015, Pewny et al. presented MULTI-MH [3], the
first cross-architecture binary code search approach. MULTI-
MH indexed functions by their input-output semantics. Given a
function compiled for one CPU architecture (e.g., x86) MULTI-
MH can find similar functions compiled for other architectures
(e.g., MIPS). This problem quickly gained traction due to the
popularity of embedded devices. In 2016, Lageman et al. [72]
trained a neural network to decide if two functions were
compiled from the same source code. The use of deep learning
has picked up in the last two years, e.g., αDIFF (2018),
INNEREYE (2019), and ASM2VEC (2019).
VI. APPROACHES
In this section, we systematize the approaches of bi-
nary code similarity, describing the Approach Characteristics
columns in Table I. We recommend the reader to print Table I
in a separate page to have it in hand while reading this section.
A. Comparison Type
Columns: Input Comparison; Approach Comparison
This section discusses the type of comparison between the
approach inputs, as well as the finer granularity comparisons
that may be used by the approach.
Input comparison. All 61 works analyzed compare their
inputs to identify similarity. That is, no approach identifies
identical inputs (since a hash suffices for that) or input equiv-
alence since it is an undecidable problem [101] that can only
be solved efficiently for small pieces of binary code. Thus,
we classify binary code similarity approaches based on their
input comparison as: one-to-one (OO, 21 approaches), one-
to-many (OM, 30 approaches), and many-to-many (MM, 10
approaches). The dominance of OM approaches is due to the
high interest in binary code search in the last decade.
It is always possible to build an OM or MM approach
from an OO approach. For example, a simple implementation
of an OM approach is to compare the given query piece of
binary code with each of the n targets using an OO approach
that returns the similarity between both inputs. Then, simply
rank the n targets by decreasing similarity and return the top
k entries or the entries above a similarity threshold. However,
most OM approaches avoid this simple implementation since
it is inefficient. The two main solutions to improve perfor-
mance are extracting a feature vector from each input and
storing the target pieces of binary code in a repository with
indices. Obtaining a feature vector for each input allows to
perform the feature extraction only once per input. This offers
significant benefits when the feature extraction is expensive,
e.g., in the case of BLEX whose feature extraction requires
executing a piece of binary code multiple times with different
inputs. Once the feature vectors have been extracted, a similar-
ity metric between two feature vectors is used. This similarity
metric is typically cheap to compute as feature vectors are
often numerical or Boolean. A common source of confusion is
that some approaches propose similarity metrics, while others
propose distance metrics. It is important to keep in mind that
when the metrics are normalized between zero and one, the
distance is simply one minus the similarity. The other solution
used by OM approaches is adding indices on a subset of the
features in the feature vector. The indices can be used to reduce
the number of comparisons by applying the similarity metric
only between the feature vector of the input piece of binary
code and the feature vectors of selected targets more likely to
be similar.
Approach comparison. Most approaches use a single type of
comparison: similarity (42 approaches), equivalence (5), and
identical (2). Note that even if only one type of comparison is
used in the approach, it may differ from the input comparison.
For example, EXEDIFF looks for identical instructions in the
process of diffing two programs. There are 12 approaches
that use multiple comparison types at different granularities.
Of those, six use identical comparison at finer granularities
to quickly identify the same pieces of binary code (BMAT,
DR2005, SWPQS2006, BINCLONE) or to reduce expensive
comparisons such as graph isomorphism (SMIT, SPAIN). The
other six use equivalence comparisons at finer granularities to
capture semantic similarity.
B. Granularity
Columns: Input Granularity; Approach Granularities
We separate the input granularity from the granularities
of the pieces of binary code compared in the approach (i.e.,
approach granularities) since it is common to use finer gran-
ularities (e.g., functions) to compare coarser input granularity
(e.g., whole programs).
We have identified 8 comparison granularities: instruction
(I), set of related instructions (I*), basic block (B), set of
related basic blocks (B*), function (F), set of related functions
(F*), trace (T), and whole program (P). Instruction, basic
block, function, and whole program are standard granulari-
ties that require no explanation. Related instructions (I*) are
either consecutive (e.g., n-gram) or share a property (e.g.,
data dependent). They may belong to different basic blocks,
and even to different functions. For example, TRACY groups
instructions that collectively impact an output variable. Related
basic blocks (B*) share structural properties (e.g., graphlets in
a CFG) or belong to the same execution path. Basic blocks in
a set may belong to the same or multiple functions. Related
functions (F*) implement a program component such as a
library, a class, or a module. Trace granularity compares the
execution trace of two binary programs on the same input.
The most common input granularity is function (26 ap-
proaches) followed by whole program (25) and related basic
blocks (4). Whole program is the preferred input granularity
for OO approaches (16/21 ) since most binary code diffing
approaches try to establish a one-to-one mapping between all
functions in the input programs, and also for MM (7/10 )
approaches that tend to cluster input programs. On the other
hand, function is the preferred granularity for binary code
search approaches (21/30 ). Another four binary code search
approaches use B* to identify code reuse that covers only a
subset of a function or crosses function boundaries.
The most common approach granularity is function (30
approaches) followed by basic block (20). The majority of
approaches (47/61) use different input and approach granular-
ities, i.e., use finer approach granularities to compare coarser
input granularity. Most approaches with the same input and
approach granularity perform function searches (12/14). The
11 approaches that perform equivalence comparisons do so
at fine granularities due to its low efficiency: six have B
granularity, five I*, and one F. Some approaches accumulate
features at a fine granularity that are never directly compared
and thus do not show in the approach granularities column. For
instance, GEMINI accumulates basic block features to generate
a numerical vector at function granularity. Thus, only functions
are compared.
C. Syntactic Similarity
Column: Syntactic similarity
Syntactic approaches capture similarity of the code rep-
resentation, more especifically they compare sequences of
instructions. Most commonly, the instructions in a sequence
are consecutive in the virtual address space and belong to
the same function. The instructions in the sequence may first
be normalized, e.g., considering only the mnemonic, only the
opcode, or normalizing the operands into classes. We detail
instruction normalization in Section VI-J and simply refer to
instruction sequences in the rest of this subsection.
The instruction sequences may be of fixed or variable
length. Fixed-size sequences are obtained by sliding a window
over the instruction stream, e.g., over the linearly-ordered
instructions in a function. This process is characterized by the
window size, i.e., the number of instructions in the sequence,
and the stride, i.e., the number of instructions to slide the
start of the window to produce the next sequence. When the
stride is smaller than the window size, consecutive sequences
overlap. When the stride is one, the resulting sequence is
called an n-gram. For example, given the sequence of in-
struction mnemonics {mov, push, add} two 2-grams will be
extracted: {mov, push} and {push, add}. There are 7 works
that use n-grams: IDEA, MBC, RENDEZVOUS, MUTANTX-
S, EXPOSE´, ILINE, and KAM1N0. Fixed-size sequences are
also used by SWPQS2006 with a configurable stride larger
than one. RENDEZVOUS, in addition to n-grams, also uses n-
perms, unordered n-grams that capture instruction reordering
within the sequence. An n-perm may capture multiple n-grams,
e.g., 2-perm {mov, push} captures 2-grams {mov, push} and
{push,mov}.
The most common methods to compare instruction se-
quences are hashing, embedding, and alignment. Hashing
is used by 6 approaches (BMAT, DR2005, SWPQS2006,
SMIT, BINCLONE, SPAIN) to obtain a fixed-length value out
of a variable-length instruction sequence. If the hash values
are the same, the sequences are similar. Five approaches
generate an embedding from n-gram sequences (IDEA, MBC,
MUTANTX-S, EXPOSE´, KAM1N0). Three approaches (EXED-
IFF, TRACY, BINSEQUENCE) align two sequences to produce
a mapping between them by inserting gaps in either sequence
to account for inserted, removed, and modified instructions.
These approaches define a similarity score when instructions
are aligned, and a gap score when an instruction aligns with a
gap. Other less common comparison methods are using vectors
of Boolean features (ILINE) and encoding sequences as strings
for indexing (RENDEZVOUS).
D. Semantic Similarity
Column: Semantic similarity
Semantic similarity captures if the code being compared
has similar effects, as opposed to syntactic similarity that
captures similarity in the code representation. The semantics
of a piece of binary code can be described by the changes it
produces in the process state, i.e., updates to the content of
registers and memory. We identify 26 approaches computing
semantic similarity. Most of them capture semantics at basic
block granularity because basic blocks are straight-line code
without control flow. Three methods are used to capture
semantics: instruction classification, input-output pairs, and
symbolic formulas.
Instruction classification. The first approach to introduce
semantics into binary code similarity was KKMRV2005,
which classified instructions into 14 classes (e.g., arithmetic,
logic, data transfer) and used a 14-bit value to capture the
classes of the instructions in a basic block. This semantic
color bitvector captures the effects of the basic block. This
approach was later adopted by BMM2006, BEAGLE, FOSSIL,
and SIGMA. Instruction classification can be used to compute
semantic similarity, but cannot determine if two pieces of
binary code are, or are not, equivalent.
Input-output pairs. Intuitively, two pieces of binary code are
functionally equivalent if given the same input they produce
the same output, for all possible inputs. Such equivalence
is independent of the code representation and compares the
final state after the code is executed, ignoring intermediate
program states. This approach was proposed by Jiang et al.
on source code [102] and later used by numerous binary code
similarity approaches: BINHASH, MXW2015, BLEX, MULTI-
MH, BINGO, CACOMPARE, SPAIN, KS2017 and IMF-SIM.
It involves executing both pieces of binary code with the same
input and comparing their output, repeating the process many
times. If the output differs for any input, then the two pieces
of binary code are not equivalent. Unfortunately, to determine
that both pieces are equivalent, the approach would require
testing all possible inputs, which is not realistic for any non-
trivial piece of binary code. Thus, in practice, this approach
can only determine that two pieces of binary code are likely
equivalent, with a confidence proportional to the fraction of
inputs that have been tested, or that they are not equivalent
(with certainty). The tested inputs are typically selected ran-
domly, although it is possible to use other selection rules, e.g.,
taking values from the program data section (CACOMPARE).
It is generally a dynamic approach, but some approaches (e.g.,
MULTI-MH) evaluate concrete inputs on statically-extracted
symbolic formulas.
Symbolic formula. A symbolic formula is an assignment
statement in which the left side is an output variable and
the right side is a logical expression of input variables and
literals that captures how to derive the output variable. For
instance, the instruction add %eax,%ebx can be represented
with the symbolic formula EBX2 = EAX + EBX1 where
EBX2 and EBX1 are symbols representing the values of the
EBX register before and after executing the instruction. Eleven
approaches use symbolic formulas: BINHUNT, IBINHUNT,
BINHASH, EXPOSE´, TRACY, RMKNHLLP2014, TEDEM,
COP, MULTI-MH, ESH, and XMATCH. Of those, eight ap-
proaches extract symbolic formulas at basic block granularity,
XMATCH and EXPOSE´ extract formulas for the return values
of a function, and BINSIM extracts symbolic formulas from an
execution trace that capture how the arguments of a system call
were derived. Three methods are used to compare symbolic
formulas: using a theorem prover to check for equivalence,
comparing the semantic hash of the formulas to check for
equivalence, and computing the similarity of the graph repre-
sentation of the formulas.
Theorem prover – BINHUNT introduced the idea of using
theorem provers such as STP [103] or Z3 [104] to check if
two symbolic formulas are equivalent, i.e., whether the output
variable always contains the same value after the execution
of both formulas, assuming that the input variables share the
same values. The main limitation of this approach is that it is
computationally expensive because it can only perform pair-
wise equivalence queries, the solving time quickly increases
with formula sizes, and the solver may fail to return an answer
for some queries. Note that a piece of binary code may have
multiple outputs (registers and variables in memory), each
represented by its own symbolic formula. These approaches
need to try all pair-wise comparisons and check if there exists
a permutation of variables such that all matched variables
contain the same value.
Semantic hashes – An alternative to using a theorem prover is
to check if two symbolic formulas have the same hash, after
normalizing the formulas (e.g., using common register names)
and simplifying them (e.g., applying constant propagation).
The intuition is that if the two symbolic formulas have the
same hash they should be equivalent. Three approaches use
semantic hashes: BINHASH, BINJUICE, and GITZ. Semantic
hashes are efficient, but are limited in that it is possible for
two equivalent formulas to have different hashes even after
normalization and simplification. For example, reordering of
symbolic terms in one of the formulas (e.g., due to instruction
reordering) results in a different hash.
Graph distance – XMATCH and TEDEM represent the symbolic
formula of a basic block as a tree, and compute their similarity
by applying graph/tree edit distance. Computing the graph/tree
edit distance is more expensive than comparing semantic
hashes, but the graph representation has the advantage over
semantic hashes that it can handle term reordering.
E. Structural Similarity
Column: Structural similarity
Structural similarity computes similarity on graph repre-
sentations of binary code. It sits between syntactic and se-
mantic similarity since a graph may capture multiple syntactic
representations of the same code and may be annotated with
semantic information. Structural similarity can be computed
on different graphs. The three most common are the intra-
procedural control flow graph (CFG), the inter-procedural
control flow graph (ICFG), and the callgraph (CG). All three
are directed graphs. In the CFG and ICFG, nodes are basic
blocks and an edge indicates a control flow transition (e.g.,
branch, jump). Basic blocks in a CFG belong to a single
function; each function has its own CFG. Basic blocks in the
ICFG belong to any program function; there is one ICFG per
program. In the CG, nodes are functions and edges capture
caller-callee relationships.
The intuition behind structural approaches is that CG,
ICFG, and CFGs are fairly stable representations whose struc-
ture varies little for similar code. Approaches that operate on
the CG or ICFG have a whole program input granularity, while
those that operate on CFGs may have function granularity, or
use function similarity as a step towards whole program simi-
larity. Structural similarity approaches may use labeled graphs.
For example, F2004 and DR2005 use node labels in the
CG to capture structural information about a function’s CFG
(e.g., number of instructions and edges). Other approaches
label basic blocks in the CFG/ICFG with a feature vector that
captures the semantics of the basic clock (e.g., KKMRV2005,
BINJUICE) or its embedding (GENIUS, GEMINI, see §VI-F).
Edge labels can be used to capture the type of control flow
transfer (BMM2006) or to aggregate the semantic labels of
source and destination nodes (FOSSIL).
Structural similarity is used by 27 approaches. 14 ap-
proaches operate only on CFGs; five on both CFGs and
the CG; four only on the ICFG; and two only on the CG.
There are also three approaches that use non-standard graphs:
SIGMA proposes a semantic integrated graph that combines
information from the CFG, CG, and register flow graph,
while QSM2015 and LIBV use the execution dependence
graph [105]. The remainder of this subsection discusses dif-
ferent approaches used to compute graph similarity.
(Sub)Graph isomorphism – Most structural similarity ap-
proaches check for variations of graph isomorphism. An
isomorphism of two graphs G and H is an edge-preserving
bijection f between their node sets such that if any two
nodes u, v are adjacent in G, then f(u) and f(v) are also
adjacent in H . Graph isomorphism requires that the node set
cardinality is the same in both graphs, which is too strict
for binary code similarity. Thus, approaches instead check
for subgraph isomorphism, which determines if G contains
a subgraph isomorphic to H . Subgraph isomorphism is a
known NP-complete problem. Other approaches check for the
maximum common subgraph isomorphism (MCS), which finds
the largest subgraph isomorphic to two graphs and is also
NP-Complete. Given the high complexity of both problems,
approaches try to reduce the number of graph pairs that need
to be compared, as well as the size of the compared graphs.
For example, DR2005 avoids comparing CFGs with the same
hash (match) and CFGs with very different number of nodes
and edges (unlikely match). IBINHUNT reduces the number
of nodes to consider by assigning taint labels to basic blocks.
Only nodes with the same taint label are considered in the
subgraph isomorphism. For candidate graph pairs that pass the
filtering, approximate algorithms are used that can be grouped
into greedy and backtracking.
Greedy – These approaches perform neighborhood exploration.
An initial set of matching nodes is first identified. Then,
the matching is recursively expanded by checking only the
neighbors (i.e., parents or children) of already matched nodes.
BMAT, F2004, DR2005, LKI2013, TEDEM, MULTI-MH,
KLKI2016, KAM1N0, BINSEQUENCE, and BINARM use this
approach. A limitation of greedy algorithms is that early errors
propagate, significantly reducing the accuracy.
Backtracking – Backtracking algorithms fix a wrong matching
by revisiting the solution, and if the new matching does
not improve the overall matching it is reverted (BMM2006,
BINHUNT, IBINHUNT, MXW2015, QSM2015, DISCOVRE).
Backtracking is more expensive, but can improve accuracy by
avoiding local optimal matching.
Optimization. An alternative used by four approaches (SMIT,
BINSLAYER, CXZ2014, GENIUS) is to model graph simi-
larity as an optimization problem. Given two CFGs and a
cost function between two basic blocks, they find a bijective
mapping between the two CFGs with minimum cost. Such
bipartite matching ignores graph structure, i.e., does not use
edge information. To address this, SMIT and BINSLAYER
assign lower cost to connected basic blocks. To perform the
matching, SMIT, BINSLAYER, and CXZ2014 use the O(n3)
Hungarian algorithm, while GENIUS uses a genetic algorithm.
K-subgraph matching. KKMRV2005 proposed to divide a
graph into k-subgraphs, where each subgraph contains only
k connected nodes. Then, generate a fingerprint for each k-
subgraph and the similarity of two graphs corresponds to
the maximum number of k-subgraphs matched. Four other
approaches later leveraged this approach: BEAGLE, CXZ2014,
RENDEZVOUS, and FOSSIL.
Path similarity. There are three approaches (COP, SIGMA,
BINSEQUENCE) that convert function similarity into a path
similarity comparison. First, they extract a set of executions
paths from a CFG, then define a path similarity metric between
execution paths, and finally combine the path similarity into a
function similarity.
Graph embedding. Another method used by GENIUS,
VULSEEKER, and GEMINI, detailed in §VI-F, is to extract a
real-valued feature vector from each graph and then compute
the similarity of the feature vectors.
F. Feature-Based Similarity
Column: Feature-based, Machine learning
A common method (28 approaches) to compute similarity
is to represent a piece of binary code as a vector or a set of
features such that similar pieces of binary code have similar
feature vectors or feature sets. A feature captures a syntactic,
semantic, or structural property of the binary code. Features
can be Boolean, numeric, or categorical. Categorical features
have discrete values, e.g., the mnemonic of an instruction. A
feature vector typically has all numeric or all Boolean features,
the latter is called a bitvector. Categorical features are typically
first encoded into Boolean features using one-hot encoding
or into real-valued features using an embedding. Of the 28
approaches, 21 use numeric feature vectors, six use feature
sets, and BINCLONE uses bitvectors. Once the features have
been extracted, a similarity metric between feature vectors
or feature sets is used to compute the similarity. Common
similarity metrics are the Jaccard index for feature sets, dot
product for bitvectors, and the Euclidean or cosine distance
for numeric vectors.
Figure 3 shows two alternative methods for feature-based
similarity. The top method comprises of two steps: feature
selection and feature encoding. Feature selection is a manual
process where an analyst uses domain knowledge to identify
representative features. The alternative approach showed below
is learning to automatically generate real-valued feature vec-
tors, called embeddings, from training data. Embeddings are
used by eight recent approaches (GENIUS, GEMINI, αDIFF,
VULSEEKER, RLZ2019, INNEREYE, ASM2VEC, SAFE).
Embeddings are used in natural language processing (NLP) to
encode categorical features using real-valued numbers, which
helps deep learning algorithms by reducing the dimensionality
and increasing the density of feature vectors compared to one-
hot encoding. Embeddings enable automatic feature extraction
and efficient similarity computation. But, features in embed-
dings do not provide information about what has been learnt.
Binary code similarity embeddings can be classified by
the properties they captured and their granularity. The first
binary code similarity approach using embeddings was GE-
NIUS, later followed by VULSEEKER and GEMINI. All the
three approaches build a graph embedding for the ACFG of
a function, i.e., a CFG with nodes annotated with selected
basic block features. While GENIUS uses clustering and graph
edit distance to compute the embedding, VULSEEKER and
GEMINI improve efficiency by training a neural network that
avoids expensive graph operations. Later approaches (αDIFF,
RLZ2019, INNEREYE, ASM2VEC, SAFE) avoid manually
selected features by focusing on instruction, or raw byte,
co-ocurrencence. In NLP, it is common to extract a word
embedding that captures word co-occurrence (e.g., word2vec)
and then build a sentence embedding that builds upon it.
RLZ2019 and INNEREYE use an analogous approach by con-
sidering instructions as words and basic blocks as sentences.
SAFE uses similar approach to create functions embedding
than basic blocks. Also related is ASM2VEC that obtains a
function embedding by combining path embeddings capturing
instruction co-occurrence along different execution paths in
the function. Instead of using instruction co-ocurrence, αDIFF
computes a function embedding directly from the sequence of
raw bytes of a function using a convolutional network.
Machine learning. We identify three uses of machine learning
in binary code similarity approaches: (1) to generate an embed-
ding as explained above, (2) to cluster similar pieces of binary
code using unsupervised learning (BINHASH, MUTANTX-S,
ILINE, RMKNHLLP2014, KLKI2016, GENIUS), and (3) to
classify with a probability if the pieces of binary code are
being compiled from the same source code (BINDNN, IMF-
SIM). BINDNN is the first use of neural networks for binary
code similarity. Instead of generating an embedding, BINDNN
directly uses a neural network classifier to determine if two
functions are compiled from the same source code. Surpris-
ingly, BINDNN is not cited by later binary code similarity
approaches including those using neural networks to build
embeddings.
G. Hashing
Column: Locality sensitive hashing
A hash is a function that maps data of arbitrary size to a
fixed-size value. Hash values are compact to store, efficient
to compute, and efficient to compare, which makes them
great for indexing. Hashes operate at the raw-byte level. They
are not especifically designed for binary code, but rather for
arbitrary binary data. However, three classes of hashes have
been used for binary code similarity: cryptographic hashes,
locality-sensitive hashes, and executable file hashes. Crypto-
graphic hashes capture identical, rather than similar, inputs.
They are used by some binary code similarity approaches
to quickly identify duplicates at fine granularity (e.g., basic
block). Locality-sensitive hashes produce similar hash values
for similar inputs, as oppossed to cryptographic hashes where
a small difference in the input generates a completely different
hash value. Executable file hashes take as input an executable
file, but the hash computation only considers parts of the
executable such as the import table or selected fields of the
executable’s header. Their goal is to output the same hash value
for polymorphic variants of the same malware.
Locality sensitive hashing (LSH). LSH produces similar hash
values for similar inputs, efficiently approximating a nearest
neighbor search. LSH algorithms typically apply multiple hash
functions on the given input and produce the same hash value
for similar inputs, i.e., they increase collision probability for
similar inputs. LSH is used in binary code similarity to boost
performance. For example, it is used by OM approaches for
indexing pieces of binary code, enabling efficient binary code
search (KAM1N0, GEMINI, INNEREYE). Of the 11 approaches
that use LSH, seven use MinHash [106] (BINHASH, MULTI-
MH, GENIUS, BINSEQUENCE, BINSHAPE, CACOMPARE,
BINSIGN), two do not specify the algorithm used (GEMINI,
INNEREYE), SWPQS2006 uses the algorithm by Gionis et
al. [107], and KAM1N0 proposes its own Adaptive Locality
Sensitive Hashing (ALSH).
Fuzzy hashing is a popular type of LSH used to compute
similarity of arbitrary files. For example, the VirusTotal file
analysis service [108] reports ssdeep [52] hashes for submitted
files. Other fuzzy hashes include tlsh [53], sdhash [109], and
mrsh-v2 [110]. None of the 61 approaches use them, but
we briefly discuss them because they are often applied to
executable files. When applied on executables, fuzzy hashes
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Fig. 3. Two alternative methods for feature-based similarity.
may capture similarity of the binary code, but also similarity
of data present in the executables. This issue has been recently
examined by Pagani et al. [111]. Their results show that
when applied only on the code of the .text section they
work significantly worse than when used for whole program
similarity. In fact, they show that a byte change at the right
position, extra nop instructions, and instruction swapping can
degrade similarity significantly (in some cases bring it down
to zero). They observe that when compiling the same source
code with different optimizations, the data sections of the
executables remain the same, which seems to be a key reason
fuzzy hashes work better on whole executables.
Executable file hashes. This class of hashes are especifically
designed for executable files. They are designed to output the
same hash value for polymorphic variants of the same malware.
The hash computation only considers parts of the executable
that are less likely to change when simply repacking, or
resigning, the same executable. They are not used by any
of the 61 approaches, but we briefly describe three popular
hashes for completeness. peHash [51] hashes selected fields
of a PE executable that are less susceptible to changes during
compilation and packing, e.g., initial stack size, heap size.
ImpHash hashes the import table of an executable. Since the
functionality of packed variants is the same, their imported
functions should be the same as well. Unfortunately, it gives
false positives with unrelated executables packed with the same
packer, if the packer reconstructs the original import table at
runtime. Authentihash is the hash of a PE executable ignor-
ing its Windows Authenticode code signing data. It enables
identifying the same executable signed by different publishers.
It hashes the whole PE executable except three pieces: the
Authenticode data, pointers to the Authenticode data, and the
file checksum.
H. Supported Architectures
Column: Cross-architecture
A cross-architecture approach can compare pieces of binary
code for different CPU architectures, e.g., x86, ARM, and
MIPS. This differs from architecture-independent approaches
(e.g., F2004) that support different architectures, but cannot
cross-compare among them, i.e., they can compare two x86
inputs and two MIPS inputs, but cannot compare an x86 input
with a MIPS input. There are 16 cross-architecture approaches,
all proposed since 2015. A common application is given a
buggy piece of binary code, to search for similar pieces of
binary code, compiled for other architectures, which may
also contain the bug. For example, to search for programs in
firmware images where a version of OpenSSL vulnerable to
Heartbleed has been statically compiled.
The code syntax for different architectures may signifi-
cantly differ as they may use separate instruction sets with
different instruction mnemonics, sets of registers, and de-
fault calling conventions. Thus, cross-architecture approaches
compute semantic similarity. Cross-architecture approaches
employ one of two techniques. Seven approaches lift the binary
code to an architecture-independent intermediate representa-
tion (IR): MULTI-MH, MOCKINGBIRD, BINGO, XMATCH,
CACOMPARE, GITZ, FIRMUP. Then, identical analysis can
be peformeed on the IR, regardless of the origin architecture.
The advantage is that the analysis only depends on the IR
and the IR design can be outsourced to a separate group.
Section VII details the specific architectures supported by each
approach and the IRs they use. An alternative approach used
by 9 approaches is to use feature-based similarity (discussed in
§VI-F). These approaches use a separate module for each ar-
chitecture to obtain a feature vector that captures the semantics
of the binary code (DISCOVRE, BINDNN, GENIUS, GEMINI,
αDIFF, VULSEEKER, RLZ2019, INNEREYE, SAFE).
I. Type of Analysis
Column: Static analysis; Dynamic analysis; Dataflow analysis
Binary code similarity approaches can use static analysis,
dynamic analysis, or both. Static analysis examines the disas-
sembled binary code, without executing it. Instead, dynamic
analysis examines code executions by running the code on
selected inputs. Dynamic analysis can be performed online,
as the code executes in a controlled environment, or offline
on traces of the execution. Fifty one approaches use only
static analysis, four use only dynamic analysis, and six com-
bine both. The dominance of static analysis for binary code
similarity is due to most applications requiring all the input
code to be compared. This is easier with static analysis as it
provides complete code coverage. Dynamic analysis examines
one execution at a time and can only determine similarity of the
code run in that execution. To increase the coverage of dynamic
analysis, three approaches (IBINHUNT, BLEX, IMF-SIM) run
the code on multiple inputs covering different execution paths
and combine the results. However, it is infeasible to run any
non-trivial piece of binary code on inputs that cover all possible
execution paths.
One advantage of dynamic analysis is simplicity, as mem-
ory addresses, operand values, and control-flow targets are
known at runtime, which sidesteps static analysis challenges
such as memory aliasing and indirect jumps. Another advan-
tage is that it can handle some obfuscations and does not
require disassembly of the code, also difficult with obfuscated
code [112]. Section VIII details which approaches have evalu-
ated its robustness on obfuscated code. Overall, dynamic anal-
ysis has been used in binary code similarity for malware un-
packing (SMIT, BEAGLE, MUTANTX-S, CXZ2014, BINSIM),
for operating on trace granularity (BINSIM, KS2017), and
for collecting runtime values for semantic similarity (BLEX,
BINSIM, IMF-SIM).
Dataflow analysis is a common type of analysis that
examines how values propagate through the code. It comprises
of data sources to be tracked (e.g., registers or memory loca-
tions holding specific variables), propagation rules defining
how values are propagated by different instructions or IR
statements, and sinks, i.e., program points where to check the
values reaching them. Of the 19 approaches that use dataflow
analysis, 16 use symbolic execution to extract a set of symbolic
formulas to compute semantic similarity (§VI-D). SPAIN uses
taint analysis to summarize the patterns of vulnerabilities and
their security patches. And, IBINHUNT uses both taint analysis
and symbolic execution. It first uses taint analysis as a filter
to find pieces of binary code that process the same user input,
restricting the expensive subgraph isomorphism computation to
those with the same taint label. And, it computes basic block
similarity using symbolic formulas. IMF-SIM uses backward
taint analysis to infer pointer arguments of a function from
dereference errors.
J. Normalization
Column: Normalization
Syntactic similarity approaches often normalize instruc-
tions, so that two instructions that are normalized to the same
form are considered similar despite some syntactic differences,
e.g., different registers being used. Overall, there are 33
approaches that use instruction normalization. They apply the
following three types of instruction normalization:
• Operand removal – A normalization used by nine
approaches is to abstract an instruction only by its
mnemonic or opcode, ignoring all operands. For ex-
ample, add%eax,%ebx and add [%ecx],%edx would
be both represented by add and considered similar,
despite both using different operands.
• Operand normalization – A normalization used
by 17 approaches is to replace instruction operands
with symbols that capture the operand type such
as REG for register, MEM for memory, and IMM
for immediate values. For example, add%eax,%ebx
and add%ecx,%edx would be both represented as
addREG,REG, matching the instructions despite
different register allocations used by the compiler.
Operand normalization abstracts less than operand
removal. For example, add [%ecx],%edx would be
represented as addMEM,REG and thus be consid-
ered different from the above. Some approaches also
use different symbols for general purpose registers and
segment registers, and for operands of different sizes
(e.g., RegGen8 and RegGen32 in BINCLONE).
• Mnemonic normalization – A normalization used
by 3 approches (BMAT, EXPOSE´ and ILINE) is to
represent multiple mnemonics by the same symbol.
For example, both BMAT and ILINE represent all
conditional jumps (e.g., je, jne) with the same
symbol to account for the compiler modifying jump
conditions.
Another type of normalization is to ignore code that should
not affect the semantics. For example, some instruction sets
contain no-op instructions that do not change the process state.
And, compilers often use no-op equivalent instructions for
padding such as instructions that move a register to itself, e.g.,
mov%eax,%eax. No-op equivalent instructions do not matter
for semantic similarity and structural similarity approaches,
but since they change the syntax they may affect syntactic
similarity approaches. Three approaches remove no-op instruc-
tions (ILINE, MXW2015, QSM2015). A few approaches
also remove unreachable dead code (BMM2006, FIRMUP),
which may be introduced by obfuscations; function epilogue
and prologue (EXPOSE´) instructions, which may make small
unrelated functions to look similar; and functions added by the
compiler to load the program, not present in the source code
(BINGO, SIGMA).
VII. IMPLEMENTATIONS
This section systematizes the implementation of the 61
approaches. For each approach, Table III shows the static and
dynamic platforms it builds on, the programming language
used to implement the approach, whether the implementation
supports distributing the analysis, the supported target program
architectures and operating systems, and how the approach
is released. A dash (-) indicates that we could not find the
information (i.e., unknown), while a cross (7) means unsup-
ported/unused.
Building a binary code similarity approach from scratch
requires significant effort. Thus, all approaches build on top
of previously available binary analysis platforms or tools,
which provide functionality such as disassembly and control
flow graphs for static analysis, or instruction-level monitoring
for dynamic analysis. However, the implementation of an
approach may only use a subset of the functionality offered
by the underlying platform. The most popular static platform
is IDA (42 approaches), followed by BAP (4), DynInst (3),
and McSema (2). IDA main functionalities are disassembly
and building control flow graphs. Its popularity comes from
supporting a large number of architectures. Some binary
analysis platforms already support using IDA as their disas-
sembler, so it is not uncommon to combine IDA and another
platform (6 approaches). Among dynamic approaches, PIN
is the most popular with 5 approaches, followed by TEMU
and ANUBIS with 3 approaches each. Previous work has
analyzed binary analysis platforms used by binary code type
inferece approaches [35]. Since most platforms overlap, we
refer the reader to that work for platform details, but provide
an extended version of their table in the Appendix (Table V)
with six extra platforms.
A few approaches build on top of previous binary code
similarity approaches. One case is that both approaches
have overlapping authors. For example, RMKNHLLP2014
is based on BINJUICE, and MXW2015 extends IBINHUNT,
which already shared components with BINHUNT. The other
case is using a previously released approach. For example,
BINSLAYER and SPAIN use BINDIFF as a first stage filter to
find matched functions.
TABLE III. COMPARISON OF THE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF BINARY CODE SIMILARITY APPROACHES. SYMBOL – MEANS INFORMATION IS UNKNOWN.
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EXEDIFF [25] – 7 – 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7 7 7
BMAT [32] Vulcan 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
F2004 [26] IDA 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7
DR2005 [27] IDA 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 X
KKMRV2005 [19] – 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7
BMM2006 [20] Boomerang 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
BINHUNT [28] IDA 7 – 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7
SWPQS2006 [56] IDA 7 C++ 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7
SMIT [16] IDA 7 C++ 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
IDEA [57] NewBasic 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
MBC [58] – 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
IBINHUNT [59] IDA Temu – 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
BEAGLE [22] – Anubis – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
BINHASH [60] ROSE 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
BINJUICE [42] IDA 7 Python, Prolog 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7
BINSLAYER [61] DynInst C++ 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
RENDEZVOUS [62] DynInst 7 C++ 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
MUTANTX-S [17] IDA 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
EXPOSE´ [63] IDA 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
ILINE [23] IDA PIN C, Python 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7
LKI2013 [64] IDA 7 Python 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
TRACY [1] IDA 7 Python 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
BINCLONE [65] IDA 7 C++ 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
RMKNHLLP2014 [66] IDA 7 Python 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
CXZ2014 [21] Malwise 7 C++ 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
BLEX [67] IDA PIN C++ 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
COP [33] IDA, BAP 7 C++ 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
TEDEM [2] IDA 7 C++ 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X X 7 7
SIGMA [69] – 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
MXW2015 [24] 7 Temu Ocaml 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
MULTI-MH [3] IDA 7 C++ 7 X X X 7 X X 7 X X X 7 7
QSM2015 [70] IDA 7 C++ 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 X 7
DISCOVRE [4] IDA 7 – 7 7 X X 7 X X 7 X X 7 7 7
MOCKINGBIRD [29] IDA Valgrind Python 7 X 7 X 7 X X 7 7 X 7 7 7
ESH [5] IDA, BAP 7 C#, Python 7 X 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
TPM [71] IDA 7 Python 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
BINDNN [72] IDA 7 – 7 7 7 X X X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
GENIUS [6] IDA 7 Python 7 7 X X 7 X X 7 7 X 7 X 7
BINGO [7] IDA 7 Python 7 X 7 X X X 7 7 X X X 7 7
KLKI2016 [18] IDA PIN – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
KAM1N0 [73] IDA 7 – X 7 7 X X 7 7 7 X 7 7 X 7
BINSEQUENCE [8] IDA 7 – 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
XMATCH [9] IDA, McSema 7 – 7 X X X 7 7 X 7 X X X 7 7
CACOMPARE [74] IDA 7 Python 7 X 7 X 7 X X 7 7 X 7 7 7
SPAIN [30] IDA 7 – 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7
BINSIGN [75] IDA 7 – X 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
GITZ [10] BAP, McSema 7 – 7 X 7 7 X X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
BINSHAPE [76] IDA 7 Python 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7
BINSIM [77] 7 Temu – 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
KS2017 [31] 7 PIN C++, Python 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
IMF-SIM [78] 7 PIN C++, Python 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
GEMINI [12] IDA 7 Python 7 7 X X 7 X X 7 X X 7 X 7
FOSSIL [79] IDA, Dyninst 7 Python 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7
FIRMUP [13] IDA, Angr 7 – 7 X X X 7 X X X 7 X 7 7 7
BINARM [14] IDA 7 C++, Ptyhon 7 7 X 7 7 X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7
αDIFF [15] IDA 7 – 7 7 X X X X X 7 7 X 7 7 7
VULSEEKER [11] IDA 7 Python 7 7 X X X X X 7 7 X 7 X 7
RLZ2019 [80] – 7 – 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
INNEREYE [81] BAP 7 Python 7 7 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
ASM2VEC [82] IDA 7 – 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
SAFE [83] IDA, ANGR 7 Python 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7 7 X 7 X 7
The most popular programming language is Python (20
approaches), followed by C++ (14). One reason for this is
that the majority of approaches use IDA for disassembly
and IDA supports both C++ and Python plugins. Moreover,
two approaches (KAM1N0, BINSIGN) have used distributed
platforms, such as Hadoop, to distribute their analysis.
Binary code analysis can operate directly on a particular
instruction set (e.g., x86, ARM) or convert the instruction
set into an intermediate representation (IR). Using an IR
has two main advantages. First, it is easier to reuse the
analysis built on top of an IR. For example, supporting a new
architecture only requires adding a new front-end to translate
into the IR, but the analysis code can be reused. Second,
complex instruction sets (e.g., x86/x86-64) can be converted
into a smaller set of IR statements and expressions, which
make explicit any side-effects such as implicit operands or
conditional flags. There are 15 approaches that use an IR and
most use the IR provided by the underlying platform. Out of
15 approaches, 5 use VINE provided by BITBLAZE (BIN-
HUNT, IBINHUNT, COP, MXW2015, BINSIM), another 5
use VEX provided with VALGRIND (MULTI-MH, MOCKING-
BIRD, CACOMPARE, GITZ, FIRMUP), and two use LLVM-IR
(ESH, XMATCH). The remaining three approaches use SAGE
III (SWPQS2006), METASM (TEDEM) and REIL (BINGO).
It is surprising that only 6 of the 16 cross-architecture ap-
proaches use an IR (MULTI-MH, XMATCH, MOCKINGBIRD,
CACOMPARE, GITZ, FIRMUP). The remaining approaches
provide separate analysis modules for each architecture that
typically output a feature vector with a common format.
The most supported architectures for the target programs
to be analyzed are x86/x86-64 (59 approaches), followed
by ARM (16), and MIPS (10). The only two approaches
that do not support x86/x86-64 are EXEDIFF that targets
Digital Alpha, and BINARM that targets ARM. There are 16
cross-architecture approaches and 9 approaches that support
firmware. The first cross-architecture approach was MULTI-
MH, which added support for ARM in 2015. Since then, ARM
support has become very prevalent due to the popularity of
mobile and IoT devices. It is worth noting that even if there
are 42 approaches that use IDA, which supports more than
60 processor families, most approaches built on top of IDA
only analyze x86/x86-64 programs. The most supported OS
is Linux (41 approaches) followed by Windows (35). Only
4 approaches support MacOS. Early approaches that focused
on x86/x86-64 often used IDA to obtain support for both
PE/Windows and ELF/Linux executables. Most recently, all
approaches that leverage ARM support Linux, which is used
by Android and also by many IoT devices.
Of the 61 approaches, only 12 are open source
(BINSLAYER, TRACY, QSM2015, ESH, GENIUS, KAM1N0,
GEMINI, ASM2VEC, VULSEEKER, RLZ2019, INNEREYE,
SAFE). DR2005 was implemented in the BINDIFF com-
mercial tool, which is now available as a free binary. The
remaining approaches have not been released in any form,
although the platforms they build on may be open source.
Moreover, 4 of the 12 open-source approaches (ESH, GENIUS,
RLZ2019, INNEREYE) have partially released their source
code and machine learning models.
VIII. EVALUATIONS
This section systematizes the evaluation of the 61 binary
code similarity approaches. For each approach, Table IV
summarizes the datasets used (§VIII-A) and the evaluation
methodology (§VIII-B).
A. Datasets
The left side of Table IV describes the datasets used by
each approach. It first shows the total number of executables
used in the evaluation and their split into benign and malicious
executables. Executables may come from different programs
or correspond to multiple versions of the same program, e.g.,
with varying compiler and compilation options. Then, for
approaches that have function granularity, it captures the total
number of functions evaluated, and for approaches that analyze
firmware, the number of images from where the executables
are obtained. A dash (–) in a column means that we could
not find the number in the paper. For example, SWPQS2006
evaluates on system library files in Windows XP, but the total
number of executables is not indicated.
Most approaches use custom datasets, the one popular
benchmark is Coreutils used by 18 approaches. In addition,
approaches that evaluate on firmware use two openly available
firmwares (ReadyNAS [113] and DD-WRT [114]). Over half
of the approaches evaluate on less than 100 executables, 7
on less than 1K, 8 on less than 10K, and only 8 on over
10K. Out of 61 approaches, 37 have evaluated only on benign
programs, 8 only on malware, and 16 on both. This indicates
that binary code similarity is also popular for malware analysis.
However, of the 24 approaches evaluated on malware, only five
use packed malware samples (SMIT, BEAGLE, MUTANTX-
S, CXZ2014, BINSIM). These approaches first unpack the
malware using a custom unpacker (SMIT) or a generic (write-
and-execute) unpacker (BEAGLE, MUTANTX-S, CXZ2014,
BINSIM), and then compute binary code similarity. The rest
have access to the malware’s source code or to unpacked
samples.
For binary code search approaches that use function granu-
larity, the number of functions in the repository better captures
the dataset size. The largest dataset is by GENIUS, which
evaluates on 420M functions extracted from 8,126 firmwares.
Prior approaches had evaluated on at most 0.5M functions,
which demonstrates the scalability gains from its embedding
approach. Five other approaches have evaluated on over 1M
functions: FOSSIL (1.5M), BINSEQUENCE (3.2M), BINARM
(3.2M), FIRMUP (40M), and GEMINI (420M), which uses the
same dataset as GENIUS. In addition, INNEREYE has evaluated
on a repository of 1.2M basic blocks.
B. Methodology
The right side of Table IV describes four aspects of the
evaluation methodology used by each approach: robustness,
accuracy, performance, and comparison with prior approaches.
Robustness. The first 8 columns on the right side of Ta-
ble IV capture how authors evaluate the robustness of their
approaches, i.e., their ability to capture similarity despite
transformations applied to the input programs. First, it shows
whether they use each of the four compilers we have observed
being employed to compile the programs in the dataset: GCC,
ICC, Visual Studio (MSVS), and Clang. Then, it captures
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EXEDIFF [25] 38 38 0 0 0 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 7
BMAT [32] 32 32 0 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 0 X
F2004 [26] 8 8 0 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 X
DR2005 [27] 6 4 2 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 X
KKMRV2005 [19] 503 61 442 0 0 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 0 7
BMM2006 [20] 587 572 115 0 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 0 X
BINHUNT [28] 6 6 0 0 0 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 0 X
SWPQS2006 [56] – 1,723 0 0 0 X 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 X 0 X
SMIT [16] 102,391 0 102,391 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 0 X
IDEA [57] 26,189 13,000 13,189 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 7
IBINHUNT [59] 9 9 0 0 0 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 X
MBC [58] 27 0 27 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 7
BEAGLE [22] 381 0 381 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 1 7
BINHASH [60] 16 0 16 – 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 7
BINJUICE [42] 70 20 50 0 0 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 7
BINSLAYER [61] 44 44 0 0 0 – – – – 7 7 7 7 X 1 X
RENDEZVOUS [62] 98 98 0 0.004 M 0 X 7 7 X X X 7 7 X 0 X
MUTANTX-S [17] 137,055 0 137,055 0 0 7 7 X X 7 7 7 X X 0 X
EXPOSE´ [63] 3,075 3,075 0 0 0 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 0 X
ILINE [23] 1,891 1,777 114 0 0 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 0 X
LKI2013 [64] 20 16 4 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 1 7
TRACY [1] – – 0 1.0 M 0 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 0 X
BINCLONE [65] 90 18 72 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 1 X
RMKNHLLP2014 [66] 936 0 936 – 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 0 X
CXZ2014 [21] 16,999 1,601 25,398 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 0 X
BLEX [67] 1,140 1,140 0 0.196 M 0 X X 7 X X X 7 7 X 1 X
COP [33] 321 321 0 0 0 X X 7 7 X X 7 X X 4 7
TEDEM [2] 15 15 0 – 0 – 7 X – 7 7 7 7 X 0 X
SIGMA [69] 18 16 2 – 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 7
MXW2015 [24] 155 0 155 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 X
MULTI-MH [3] 60 60 0 – 2 X 7 7 X X X X 7 X 0 X
QSM2015 [70] 384 384 0 0.020 M 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 1 X
DISCOVRE [4] 2,280 2,280 0 0.564 M 2 X X X X X X X 7 X 2 X
MOCKINGBIRD [29] 10 10 0 – 0 X 7 7 X X X X 7 X 2 X
ESH [5] 1,000 1,000 0 – 0 X X 7 X 7 X 7 7 X 2 X
TPM [71] 7 0 7 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 4 7
BINDNN [72] – 2,068 0 0.013 M 0 X X 7 7 X X X 7 X 1 X
GENIUS [6] – 17,626 0 420 M 8,128 X 7 7 X X X X 7 X 3 X
BINGO [7] 110 110 0 0.127 M 0 X 7 7 X X X X 7 X 4 X
KLKI2016 [18] 350 30 320 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 X
KAM1N0 [73] 10 10 0 – 0 – – – – 7 7 7 7 7 4 X
BINSEQUENCE [8] 19 17 2 3.2 M 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 4 X
XMATCH [9] 72 72 0 0.007 M 1 X 7 7 X 7 X X 7 X 4 X
CACOMPARE [74] 72 72 0 – 0 X 7 7 X X X X 7 X 3 X
SPAIN [30] 28 28 0 – 0 – – – – 7 7 7 7 X 0 X
BINSIGN [75] 9 7 2 0.023 M 0 7 7 X 7 X 7 7 X X 2 X
GITZ [10] – – 0 0.5 M 0 X X 7 X 7 X X 7 X 0 X
BINSHAPE [76] 51 50 1 3 M 0 X 7 X 7 X X 7 X X 0 X
BINSIM [77] 1,062 4 1,058 0 0 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X 6 X
KS2017 [31] 11 11 0 0 0 X 7 7 X X X 7 X X 0 X
IMF-SIM [78] 1,140 1,140 0 – 0 X X 7 X X X 7 X X 3 X
GEMINI [12] 51,314 51,314 0 420 M 8,126 X 7 7 7 X 7 X 7 X 2 X
FOSSIL [79] 6,925 1,920 5,005 1.5 M 0 X X X X 7 7 7 X X 7 X
FIRMUP [13] 200,000 200,000 0 40 M 2,000 – – – – 7 7 X 7 X 2 X
BINARM [14] 0 0 0 3.2 M 5,756 X 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 X 5 X
αDIFF [15] 67,427 67,427 0 0 2 X 7 7 X X X X 7 X 6 7
VULSEEKER [11] – – 0 0.736 M 4,643 X 7 7 7 X 7 X 7 X 1 X
RLZ2019 [80] – – 0 0.202 M 0 7 7 7 X X 7 X 7 X 0 X
INNEREYE [81] – – 0 1.2 M* 0 7 7 7 X X 7 X 7 X 0 X
ASM2VEC [82] 1,116 1,116 0 0.140 M 0 X X 7 X X X 7 X X 12 X
SAFE [83] – – 0 1.847 M 0 X 7 7 X X X X 7 X 1 X
whether the authors evaluate similarity between programs com-
piled with different compilation options (cross-optimization),
between programs compiled with different compilers (cross-
compiler), and between programs compiled for different ar-
chitectures (cross-architecture). Finally, it captures whether the
authors evaluate similarity when obfuscation transformations
are applied to the input programs.
There are 34 approaches that evaluate robustness (at least
one Xin the last four robustness columns) and 27 that do not.
Many early works did not evaluate robustness. This evalua-
tion has become increasingly popular as approaches mature.
The most popular robustness evaluation is cross-optimization
(23 approaches), followed by cross-compiler (19), cross-
architecture (16), and obfuscation (13). There are 9 approaches
that have evaluated cross-optimization, cross-compiler, and
cross-architecture. Approaches that evaluate cross-compiler
also typically evaluate cross-optimization, as it is a simpler
case. Simlarly, approaches that evaluate cross-architecture
typically also evaluate cross-compiler, as cross-architecture
programs may be produced using different compilers. Note
that it is possible for approaches to compile programs with
multiple compilers, but not perform cross-compiler evaluation,
i.e., not compare similarity between programs compiled with
different compilers.
There are 13 approaches that have evaluated on obfuscated
programs. Of those, two use only source code transformations
(COP, ASM2VEC), three use only binary code transformations
(KKMRV2005, TPM, BINSHAPE), five use packed malware
(SMIT, BEAGLE, MUTANTX-S, CXZ2014, BINSIM), and
three evaluate both source code and binary code transforma-
tions (BINSIM, IMF-SIM, FOSSIL).
Accuracy evaluation and comparison. There are 49 ap-
proaches that perform a quantitative evaluation of their ac-
curacy using some ground truth (X), and 12 that perform
qualitative accuracy evaluation through case studies (7). Quan-
titative evaluation most often uses standard accuracy metrics
such as true positives, false positives, precision, and recall.
However, two approaches propose novel application-specific
accuracy metrics (ILINE, KS2017).
There are 33 approaches that compare with prior ap-
proaches. All of them compare accuracy and six also com-
pare runtime. The top target for comparison is BINDIFF
(13 approaches compare with it), followed by TRACY (5),
DISCOVRE (4), and MULTI-MH (4). Comparing accuracy
across binary code similarity approaches is challenging for
multiple reasons. First, only a small fraction of the proposed
approaches have publicly released their code (Section VII).
Since most approaches are not publicly available, comparison
is often performed by re-implementing previous approaches,
which may require significant effort. One advantage of reim-
plementation is that approaches can be compared on new
datasets. The alternative to re-implementation is to evaluate
the new approach on the same dataset used by a prior ap-
proach, and compare with the reported results. This method
is only used by 6 approaches (GENIUS, BINGO, XMATCH,
CACOMPARE, GEMINI, and BINARM) likely because most
datasets are custom and not publicly available. Fortunately, we
observe that public code release has become more common in
recent approaches. Second, the input comparison and input
granularity may differ among approaches making it nearly
impossible to perform a fair comparison. For instance, it is hard
to compare in a fair manner an approach that identifies program
similarity using callgraphs (e.g., SMIT) with an approach
comparing basic blocks (e.g., INNEREYE). Third, even when
the input comparison and input granularity are the same, the
evaluation metrics and methodology may differ, significantly
impacting the measured accuracy.
The latter challenge is best illustrated on binary code search
approaches operating at function granularity. These approaches
find the most similar functions in a repository to a given
function. They return multiple entries ranked in descending
similarity order and count a true positive if one of the top-
k most similar entries is a true match. Unfortunately, the
values of k vary across approaches and significantly impact
the accuracy, e.g., a 98% precision on top 10 is significantly
worse than a 98% precision on top 3. Thus, it becomes hard
to compare accuracy numbers obtained with different k values
and it becomes tempting to raise k until a sufficiently high
accuracy number is achieved. Furthermore, many approaches
do not describe the similarity threshold used to determine that
no similar entry exists in the repository. This means that they
always find some similar entry in the repository, even if the
similarity may be really low.
Performance. It is common (49/61) to measure the runtime
performance of an approach. Runtime is typically measured
end-to-end, but a few approaches report it for each approach
component (e.g., BINSIM). Four approaches report their
asymptotic complexity (BMM2006, SWPQS2006, ILINE,
MOCKINGBIRD).
IX. DISCUSSION
This section discusses open challenges and possible future
research directions.
Small pieces of binary code. Many binary code similarity
approaches ignore small pieces of binary code, setting a thresh-
old on the minimum number of instructions or basic blocks to
be considered. Oftentimes, only pieces of binary code with a
handful of instructions are ignored, e.g., functions with less
than 5 instructions, but some approaches use large thresholds
like 100 basic blocks in TRACY. Small pieces of binary code
are challenging because they are common, may comprise of
a single basic block that prevents structural analysis, and may
have identical syntax despite different semantics. For example,
setter functions that update the value of a field in an object have
nearly identical syntax and structure, simply setting a memory
variable with the value of a parameter. But, they may have very
different semantics, e.g., setting a security level or updating a
performance counter, Furthermore, semantic similarity tech-
niques like instruction classification, symbolic formulas, and
input-output pairs may fail to capture their differences, e.g., if
they do not distinguish different memory variables. Similarity
of small pieces of binary code remains an open challenge. One
potential avenue would be to further incorporate context. Some
structural approaches already consider the callgraph to match
functions (e.g., F2004), but this does not always suffice. We
believe that it may be possible to further incorporate other
context like locality (e.g., how close the binary code is in the
program structure) or data references (e.g., whether they use
equivalent variables).
Source-to-binary similarity. Some applications like plagia-
rism detection may require source code to be compared with
binary code. Early approaches for source-to-binary similarity
used software birthmarks that capture inherent functionality
of the source code [92], [93]. Recently, source-to-binary
similarity has been applied for searching if a known bug
in open source code exists in some target binary code [44].
The availability of source code provides more semantics (e.g.,
variable and function names, types, comments) potentially
improving accuracy compared to simply compiling the source
code and performing binary code similarity. We believe other
applications remain that require determining if a target piece
of binary code has been compiled, or has evolved, from some
given source code. For example, there may be programs for
which source code is only available for an old version and
there is a need to understand how newer binary versions have
evolved from the original source code.
Data similarity. This survey has focused on binary code
similarity, but programs comprise both code and data. There
may be situations where the data used by the code is as
important as the code, e.g., when the only change between
versions of a program is in the data used such as changing
parameters for a machine learning classifier. Furthermore, data
may be stored in complex data structures that may be key to
the functionality. There exists a long history of type inference
techniques on binary code [35], which we believe could be
combined with binary code similarity to compare the data
structures used by different pieces of binary code, or how two
pieces of binary code use the same data structure.
Semantic relationships. A different aspect of semantic simi-
larity is to identify binary code with related functionality, e.g.,
cryptographic or networking functions. This is challenging as
code that is related in its functionality may not have the same
semantics. For example, a decryption function is clearly related
to its encryption function, but performs opposite operations. So
far, most work has focused on domain specific techniques such
as those for identifying cryptographic functions (e.g., [115],
[116]). But, recently some approaches have started exploring
domain-agnostic techniques [117]. We believe further work is
needed to better define such semantic relationships and their
identification.
Scalability. The largest binary code similarity evaluation so
far is by GENIUS and GEMINI on 420M functions from 8,126
firmware images (500K functions per image). While that is a
significant step from prior approaches, if we consider instead
100K unique firmware, a conservative number since it is
expected that there will be 20 Billion IoT devices connected to
the Internet by 2020 [118], we need a binary code similarity
approach that can handle 50 Billion functions. Thus, further
improvements on scalability will be needed to realize the
vision of binary code search engines.
Obfuscation. Many challenges still remain for binary code
similarity on obfuscated code. For example, a recent study
has shown that state of the art unpacking techniques can
miss 20%–60% of the original code, e.g., due to incom-
plete function detection [89]. And, no binary code similarity
approach currently handles virtualization-based packers such
as Themida [119] and VMProtect [120], which generate a
random bytecode instruction set, transform an input piece of
binary code into that bytecode instruction set, and attach an
interpreter (or virtual machine) from the generated bytecode to
native code. Furthermore, obfuscation is best addressed with
semantic similarity, which has a challenge with obfuscation
transformations that do not respect the original semantics of
the code, but still perform its main goals.
Approach comparison. The variety of datasets and method-
ologies used to evaluate the approaches (e.g., top k evaluation
for OM approaches), together with the absence of source
code for many of them, makes it hard to perform a fair
comparison to understand their benefits and limitations. We
believe the field would greatly benefit from open datasets for
benchmarking, and independent validation under the same ex-
perimental conditions. Furthermore, there is a need to improve
the comparison of approaches that handle obfuscation, beyond
changes of compiler and compiler options. Building a dataset
that covers real-world obfuscations is fundamental given the
huge space of possible obfuscation transformations and that
each approach supports a different subset.
X. CONCLUSION
During the last 20 years, researchers have proposed many
approaches to perform binary code similarity and have applied
them to address important problems such as patch analysis,
bug search, and malware detection and analysis. The field
has evolved from binary code diffing to binary code search;
from syntactic similarity to incorporate structural and semantic
similarity; to cover multiple code granularities, to strengthen
the robustness of the comparison (i.e., cross-optimization,
cross-compiler, cross-OS, cross-architecture, obfuscation); to
scale the number of inputs compared (e.g., through hashing,
embedding, indexing); and to automatically learn similarity
features.
Despite its popularity, the area had not yet been system-
atically analyzed. This paper has presented a first survey of
binary code similarity. The core of the paper has systematized
61 binary code similarity approaches on four dimensions: the
applications they enable, their approach characteristics, how
the approaches are implemented, and the benchmarks and eval-
uation methodologies used to evaluate them. It has discussed
the advantages and limitations of different approaches, their
implementation, and their evaluation. It has summarized the
results into easy to access tables useful for both beginners and
experts. Furthermore, it has discussed the evolution of the area
and outlined the challenges that remain open, showing that the
area has a bright future.
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APPENDIX
TABLE V. COMPARISON OF THE BINARY ANALYSIS PLATFORMS USED
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BINARY CODE SIMILARITY APPROACHES.
THIS TABLE OVERLAPS WITH PREVIOUS WORK ON TYPE
INFERENCE [35]. WE HAVE ADDED FOLLOWING PLATFORMS: ANGR,
BEAENGINE, CUCKOO, NEWBASIC, MCSEMA, VULCAN.
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Angr [121] VEX X 7 X 7 X X 7 7 X X X 7 7
BAP [122] BIL X X X X X 7 7 7 X X X 7 7
Beaengine [123] 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 X 7 7
BitBlaze [124] VINE X X X 7 7 7 7 7 X X X 7 7
Boomerang [125] RTL X 7 X 7 7 X X X X X X 7 7
Cuckoo [126] 7 7 X X X X 7 7 7 X X X 7 7
Dyninst [127] 7 X X X X 7 7 7 7 7 X X 7 7
IDA [128] IDA X 7 X X X X X X X X 7 7 X
LLVM [129] LLVM-IR X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7
NewBasic [130] 7 X 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7
McSema [131] LLVM-IR X 7 X X X 7 7 7 X X X 7 7
PIN [132] 7 7 X X X 7 7 7 7 X X 7 X 7
QEMU [133] TCG 7 X X X X X X X X X X 7 7
ROSE [134] SAGE-III X 7 X 7 X X X X X X X 7 7
Valgrind [135] VEX 7 X X X X X X X X X X 7 7
Vulcan [136] VULCAN-IR X 7 X X 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7
Implementation platforms. Table V shows the intermediate
representation (IR) used by the platform, whether it supports
static and dynamic analysis, the target architectures and oper-
ating systems it supports, and how it is released (open source
or free binary). Among the 17 platforms, 12 support static
analysis and 7 dynamic analysis. The functionality provided by
static analysis platforms widely varies. IDA is a disassembler,
Boomerang is a decompiler, and the rest offer diverse static
analysis functionality such as disassembly, building control
flow graphs and call graphs, IR simplifications, and data
flow propagation. All dynamic analysis platforms can run
unmodified binaries (i.e., no need to recompile or relink).
QEMU is a whole system emulator that can run a full guest
OS (e.g., Windows) on a potentially different host OS (e.g.,
Linux). Dyninst, PIN, and Valgrind execute an unmodified tar-
get program with customizable instrumentation (e.g., through
binary rewriting) on the CPU of the host system. BAP and
BITBLAZE build their dynamic analysis components on top
of PIN and QEMU.
